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INEQUALITY, PREDATION AND WELFARE
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the relation between inequality and welfare in a general-equilibrium model
in which people can choose to be either producers or predators. We assume that some people (the
privileged) are well endowed with human capital and other people (the unprivileged) are poorly
endowed with human capital.
We analyze how the choice of the privileged between deterring and tolerating predation by
the unprivileged depends on the interpersonal distribution of human capital. We find that, if the
number of people who are unprivileged is large, but a privileged person does not have too much
human capital relative to an unprivileged person, then the privileged allocate enough time and effort
to guarding against predation to deter the unprivileged from being predators. Otherwise, the
privileged tolerate predation by the unprivileged. Interestingly, a distribution of human capital that
is more egalitarian in that the number of people who are unprivileged is smaller can result in the
privileged choosing to tolerate rather than to deter predation by the unprivileged.
Next, we partition the feasible distributions of human capital into a set of Pareto efficient
distributions and a set of Pareto inefficient distributions. Interestingly, we find that if the average
endowment of human capital is large, then the fully egalitarian distribution is not Pareto efficient.
Instead, Pareto efficiency implies an unegalitarian distribution of human capital in which each
unprivileged person has only the endowment of human capital with which he was born. In addition,
this unegalitarian distribution satisfies the Rawlsian criterion of maximizing the consumption of the
unprivileged. With this unegalitarian distribution the privileged choose to tolerate predation by the
unprivileged, and predation results in maximum consumption for everyone.
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herschel@brownvm. brown.eduMr. Benson looks to the future and sees a widening social abyss. We could
get to a situation similar to Manila, where the upper and Iniddle classes sur-
round themselves with walls and security guards to protect themselves frol]l atl
abandoned underclass. ” When asked about Mr Benson”s fear of aII urbarl
America that looks like Manila, Mr Newsome shrugs: “It’s already like tl~at,”
he says. ( The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1995, page .48. )
This paper studies the relation between inequality and welfare in a general-equilibrium
model in which people can choose to be either producers or predators. Predators are people
who produce nothing, but live by appropriating the product of the producers.l We assume
that a person chooses to be a.predator rather than a producer if and only if predation yields
higher consumption for that person than would production.
We consider a society in which some people (the privileged) are well endowed with
human capital, but in which other people (the unprivileged) are poorly endowed with human
capital. In this society, the interpersonal distribution of human capital has two dimensions:
the number of people who are unprivileged and the endowment of the human capital of a
privileged person relative to the endowment of an unprivileged person. Given the aggregate
endowment of human capital, it seems natural to define a distribution to be more egalitarian
either if the number of people who are unprivileged is smaller or if the ratio of the human
capital of a privileged person to the human capital of an unprivileged person is smaller.
Given that the consumption that a person can obtain from being a producer is an
increasing function of that person’s human capital, the unprivileged find predation more
attractive than the privileged. 2 We assume that the privileged have two alternative ways
lTl~is paper is about predation. It is not about crime, Predation and crime are not tile same tking.
Altl~ougll many predatory activities, like burglary and robbery, are criminal, many criminal activities, like
illegal gambling and drug dealing, are productive and not predatory, Also, some predatory activities, like
tke collection of taxes to support a parasitic ruling class, are not criminal.
21n this model tke only distinguisl~ing characteristic of people WILOckoose to be predators is that t.key l~ave
1to respond to the threat of’ predation by the ull]Jrivileged. O1le possibility is to allocat(’
enough time and effort to guardillg against predatioli to d(~ter tile IIliprivileg(”d t’rotll b(’illg
predators. Theo tberpossibility is to toleratepredatioli bytl~e111LI~rivileged~3
llle a.nalyse ho~v the choice of the privileged l)et~veen det[’rrilLg and tolerati]l: pr[~-
relatively little human capital and, hence, relatively poor p]orlucIL\Ie (~l)l)(~rt~ll~itif;s. .A popldar al(er(laiive
view is that predators lack tht moral attributes of honest, aud hard worliil~g people, Ill iaft., b[)t.b c)I tll(.>(-
answers could be correct — people who choose to be predators I[ligl(t lack boih tile Inul-al at(ribut<;s slid
the productive oppol-trrnities that other people have, Wong (1!)$)5) tout.aius a briei review of some of the
relevant literature.
In another paper — Grossman and Kim (1996b) — we analyse the inteusi{v of’pl-edation in & model ill
which only some people, whom we define to be amoral, are potential predat.ocs. The other people, whom
we define to be moral, always choose to be producers, no mat.tel how Iucrat.ive predation is relative t.o
production. In the present paper we implicitly &*sume that. everybody is amoral. Heuce. evel-y person is a
potential predator.
3Economic models of predation analyse choices about resource allocation. In this respect. economic rnrrdels
differ radically from biological models of predation. Most itnportantly, in economic rrr(~dels a potential
predator can choose not to be a predator if production is more lucrative than predati[)ll. In rent rast. L
biological predator does not have the alternative of being a producer. III additioil, iu t,l~e present rnodcl
a poter~tlal prey earl choose to allocate resources to deterrence another option that. does not exist in a
biological model.
In pioneering general-equilibrium models that allow for predation, Usher ( 1987) and M oselle and Polak
(1995) analyse equilibria in which people decide simultaneously whether to be producers 01-predators. [Also:
in Usher’s model producers decide how much time and effort. to put into guarding against, predati[)n. ] 11,
these models each person takes L< given the decisions of other people to be producers ()]- predators, TIIUS.
neither of these papers considers the possibility of a strategy of deterring predation,
In two previous papers – Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996a) we developed general-equilibrium models
of appropriative interaction between a pair of unitary agents in which a prey can act to deter a potential
predator. The first. of these papers, however, abstracted from the possibility that an agent would ch(]ose to
specialize in predation, The second of these papers w~< more closely related to the present paper ill that it
allowed a potential predator to choose to specialize in either predation or production, But, the role of prey
WLS preassigned. By choosing to specialize in production, the potential predatol did not become a prey, In
contr~st., in the present paper, LS in Grossman and Kim (1996 b), every potential predator is also a potential
prey.
2dation depends on the interpersonal distributiotl of lIumaIl ca[)ital. \!l~eii]ld tl]at. if’ i IL(J
number of people who are unprivileged is larg(~, hut a. privileged person doeh 1101 Iia\’e
too much human capital relative to an unprivileged persoll, l,hell (.11P]jrivi leged ~llOCiit(’
enough time and effort to guarding aga.illst predatio]l to det(er ttle unprivileged fr(~li] b(~illg
predators. Otherwise, the privileged tolerate predatioll by the unprivileged. lllterestill~lj-.
a distribution of human capital that is more egalitarian in that the nulnber of l)eople WI1O
are unprivileged is smaller can result in the privileged choosing to tolerate rather tliall (o
deter predation by the unprivileged.
Next, we partition the feasible distributions of human capital into a set of Pareto
efficient distributions and a set of Pareto inefficient distributions. The key to understanding
Pareto efficiency in this model that allows predation is to observe that the possibility of’
predation can affect aggregate net consumption ill two distinct ways. First. a.riy tillle and
effort devoted to guarding against predation reduces tile [let collsumption of producers.
Second, if the privileged tolerate predation by the unprivileged, then the human capital of
the unprivileged is wasted by not being used productively.
We find that the partition between Pareto eficient distributions and Pareto inefficient
distributions depends on the economy’s average endowment of humarl capital. Specifically, if
the average endowment of human capital is small, then both the fully egalitarian distrihutioll
as well as some of the distributions of human capital such that the privileged clloos~ to deter
predation by the unprivileged are Pareto efficient. But, if the average endowment of human
capital is large, then the fully egalitarian distribution is not Pareto efficient. Instead, Pareto
efficiency implies a distribution of human capital with a positive number of’ unprivileged
people and with each unprivileged person having only the endowment




Then, we apply the Rawlsian criterion, from Rawls (1971), and we determine which
of the Pareto efficient distributions maximizes the net consumption of the each unprivileged
3person. Another interesting result is that with the possibility oi’predatioli. if tli{~average
endowment of human capital is large. enough, then Llle 1{.awlsiarl Criterion woIIld se]e(-l.
the distribution of human capital with a. positive nrrnlber of unprivileged people alld wilh
each unprivileged person having only the endowment of human capital with whi{h he was
born. With this unegalitarian distribution of human capital, predation results ill I[la.xi]llul]l
consumption for everyone.
1. Analytical Framework
Assume that each unprivileged person has an endowment of k units of human capital.
and that each privileged person has an endowment of lK units of human capital, where
1( > k. Also, assume that each person can produce an amount of consrrn]ab!es that is
an increasing concave function of his human capital. We choose units for measuring r-on-
sumables such that an unprivileged producer can produce kti units of consumables arl[i a.
privileged producer can produce I{@ units of consumables, where O < f~ < 1. To focus on
the effects of the possibility of predation, we assume that individual productive activities
are independent, and we abstract from trade in either productive inputs or collsuma,bles.4
Finally, assume that u is the number of people who are unprivileged, and that 1 – u is
the number of people who are privileged, where we choose urlits such that the population
is one and where O < u < 1. Aside from their endowrnerlts of Ilurrlarl capital, peoP1e are
otherwise identical.
Let n be the number of people who are unprivileged and who choose to be producers,
where n ~ u, let N be the number of people who are privileged and who choose to be
producers, where N ~ 1 – u, and let ~ be the number of people, whether privileged or
unprivileged, who choose to be predators, Thus, we have n + N + r = 1.
Each producer retains the nonnegative fraction p of his production, while losing the
4Skaperd~= and Syropoulos (1996) develop a model of predation
the present paper, they analyse the interaction between two unitary
allocation decisions.
4
with trade. But, in shal-p contr~<t with
agents WhO make simultaneous resource .nonnegative fraction 1 – p to predation. Assume that ))
of predators and positively on the total amount, oftillle aILd
guarding against predation. denoted by ~G. Specifically,
depends Ilega,tively on lluml)er
effort, that, prod u(”.[”r’s d(’vote to
(1)
1
p = 1 + 19?”/ YG -
The parameter O in equation (1) determines the effectiveness of predators ill appropriat,il!g
the product of producers relative to the time and effort of producers ill ~uardillg against.
predation.
Assume further that the relative contribution of time and
guarding against predation is proportionate to his production.
leged producer devotes a nonnegative amount of time and effort
effort by each producer to
Specifically. each nnprivi-
k“G to gua.rdillg against
predation, and each privileged producer devotes a. nonnegative amount of time and effort
l{aG to guarding against predation, Thus,
(2) XG = (nkU + .4T1f’J)G.
Let z denote the net consumption of each unprivileged producer and let Z denote
the net consumption of each privileged producer after allowing for losses to predation and
for the opportunity cost of devoting time and effort to guarding against predation. It is
convenient to assume that
(3)






0. In equation (3), we can interpret z and Z to be the a,rnounts of
with no time and effort devoted to guarding against predation — that is,
with G = O — would yield the same utility as the actual combinations, pk” and k“G
and Plira and l{mG. The parameter y in equation (3) converts the opportunity cost of
devoting time and effort to guarding against predation into units of consumption.
Assume that the consumption of each predator, denoted by v, is
(4)
v = (1 -p)(nk” + Nl{a) .
T
5Equation (4) says that each predator obtains an equal snare of tile total a]llou]lt oi” prodllcl
appropriated from the producers.5
We want our model to capture the fact that guarding a.gainsl predation call deier’
predation, The concept of deterrence implies a galrle betweeri a unitary leader a.ud orl(’ or
more followers. Accordingly, we assume that decisions are made ill tile following order-.
First, the privileged decide collectively how rnurll time and effort each producer will
devote to guarding against predation. In choosing G the privileged take into accouu~ the
effect of kti G and liaG on the choice of both the privileged arid the unprivileged to be
predators. Because in equilibrium the privileged choose to be producers, the objective of
the privileged is to maximize Z, the net consumption of each privileged producer.
Second, taking kffG and K@G as given, each persoll decides whether I,o be a
producer or a predator. For a privileged person, this choice depends 011whether or I1OL.for
the given values of ktiG and IfaG, Z is as large as
choice depends on whether or not, for the given values
as v.
2. Deterrence or Toleration of Predation?
u. For a unprivileged person, this
of kOG and lC’XG, z is as large
To analyze this model, we begin by considering the decisions of the privileged arid
the unprivileged to be producers or predators. By substituting equations ( 1) and (2) into
equations (3) and (4), we find that Z ~ v if and only if G z G*(l[), where
(5)
In addition, we find that z ~ w if and only if G ~ G*(k), where
(6)
K4
‘“(k) =k~(l – ~o)”
5For simplicity, the model abstracts from possible destruction of a part o{ the product as the result of
predation. The models in Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996a) suggest how destl-uction could be incorpol-ated
into the analysis. With regard to the results derived below, destruction would make it, less likely tf{at Pareto
efficiency would imply toleration of predation.
6These results say that, if’and only if G ~ (;”(1( ). tlle[l all of i,lie privileged ])eople
choose to be producers. In other words. 1( ’’(7’=( 11) is tile lt]illiIlll]l[k aIIIOlIIit of till]e
and effort tliat each privileged producer lnrrst devote to guarding against predatioll to deter
privileged people from being predators and to support a Ilolilrivial equilibriulll with positive
production. In addition, if and only if G ~ G*(k). w]kere (;*(k) is larger thali G=( Ii).
then all of the unprivileged people choose to be produ(ers. II( other words, ~;’’~~”(k) and
litiG*(k) are the minirrlum amounts of time arid effort that each ullprivileged producer
and each privileged producer would have to devote to guardilig against, predatioll in order
to deter the unprivileged from being predators. ~
In sum, we have
/
O for G2 G*(k)
(7) r=
u for G“(k) > G z G“(Ii)
Equation (7) says that, if G is at least as large as G*(k). then everybody chooses to
be a. producer. Alternatively, if G“(k) > G ~ G*(lK), then the privileged choose to be
producers and the unprivileged choose to be predators
We consider next the collective decision of the privileged regarding G. As indicated
above, the objective of the privileged is to maximize Z. To simplify the analysis we assulrle
that the privileged choose either G equal to G*( If ) or G equal to G*(k).7
‘In this model G“(k) does not depend on IL, the number of unprivileged people, because the consumption
of a predator relative to the net consumption of an unprivileged producer does not depend 011 r, the Iiumber
of predators. With a larger number of predators the fraction of production that predators appropriate would
be larger relative to the fraction of production that producers retain. but each predator’s share of the total
amount appropriated from producers would be smaller,
7Tbis assumption abstracts from the possibility that the maximum value of Z occurs with G equal
to G’, where G’ is tbe solution to the first-order condition for an interior maximum, dZ/dG = O, given
r = u. In general, Z h~~ a local maximum at G = G“(k), and Z can have additional local maxima
either at G = G*(K) or at G = G’ = &
r
fi~. If G’ < G*(I[), then G“(l{) aud G“(k) are
7To determine the choice of G we compare the value of’ Z associated with G*( Ii ).
denoted as ZIG*(I(-)], and the value of Z associated with G*(k), denoted as Z[G*(k)].
Substituting for G*(l{) and G“(k) from equations (5) and (6), togelller with equations







Important properties of equations (8) and (9) are that both ZIG*(lf)] and Z[G*(k)] are
increasing functions of 1{. Also, ZIG*(l{)] is a decreasing function of u, but, given 1{,
ZIG”(lf)] does not depend on I{/k. In contrast, given 1(, Z[G*(k)] is a decreasing
function of /f/k, but Z[G*(k)] does not depend on u.
Comparing the values of Z[G*(J{)] and Z[G*(k)], we see that equations (8) and
(9) imply that the choice of G by the privileged that maximizes Z is
I
G“(k) for * ~ *[(f)a -11
(lo) G=
G*(l~) for —< 1:U *[(+)” - 1]
Thus, the number of people who choose to be predators, r, is
{
O for & 2 ~[(+)” -1]
(11) r=
u for & < *[(f)” – 1]
local maxima and G’ is not a local maximnm. If G*(A’) < G’ < G“(k), then G’ and G“(k) are local
maxima and G*(K) is not a local maximum. Otherwise, G“(k) is the unique local maximum. A sufficient
condition to preclude the possibility that G’ is the global maximum
— specificaUy, [( K/k)a — I](I — 78) < 1. This condition says that
larger than two,
8
is that the ratio K/k is not too large
K/k is smaller tl~an a num~er that isEquations ( 10) and ( 11) imply that if the nultlber of people W11O ar(’ ullprivile.ged. u.
is large. but the ratio of the human capital of a privileged persoli to tile hulrlall capital of a.rl
unprivileged person, Ii/kl is not large, then the privileged prodllcers devote sufficient time
and effort to guarding against predation to deter the unprivileged from preda.tio)l. other-
wise, the privileged producers choose to tolerate predation by the unprivileged. Equation
(10) also implies that the larger is u the larger is the largest value of 1(/k for whicl! 111P
privileged producers choose to deter predation by the unprivileged.
A small value of u induces the privileged producers to tolerate predation because, if
u is small. then, even with ~ equal to u, p is not too much less than one. In other words.
if u is small. then the loss to producers from tolerating predation is small.~ A large value
of lK/k induces the privileged producers to tolerate predation because, if 1(/k is large,
then. from equations (5) and (6), G“(k) is large relative to G*(If). In other words. if
If/k is large, then deterring the unprivileged from predation would require each producer
to allocate a relatively large amount of time and effort to guarding against predation.
As mentioned above, it seems natural to define a distribution of human capital to he
more egalitarian if, given the aggregate endowment of human capital, either u is smaller
(closer to zero) or K/k is smaller (closer to one). The limiting distribution that has u equal
to zero is identical to the limiting distribution that has ii/k equal to one. This limiting
distribution is fully egalitarian in that the distinction between privileged and urlprivileged
people has disappeared. (With either u equal to zero or, equivalently, If/k equal to one,
setting G equal to G*(Ii) would deter everyone from predation. )
Interestingly, a smaller value of u and a smaller value of Ii/k affect the choice
between deterrence and toleration of predation in opposite ways. A distribution of human
capital that is more egalitarian in that If/k is smaller, if anything, would result in the
H Given K/k and given tbe aggregate endowment of l~urnan capital, denoted by Q, a smaller value of
IL implies smaller values of botb li- and k. From equation (12), wl~icb is introduced below, we see t.l~at
+ln,K,k=(’f-~):
9privileged producers choosing to deter rather than LOtolerate predation. But ii distriblltio]l
of human capital that is more egalitarian in that Ii is smaller, if anything) Wollld result ill
the privileged producers choosing to tolerate. rather than to deter predat, ion.
Equations (10) and (11) also imply that the relation between ?L and ~, tile number
of people who choose to be predators, is neither continuous nor monotonic. Suppose that
the distribution of human capital is such that the privileged producers choose to tolerate
predation by the unprivileged. Hence, r equals IL. In this case, with a decrease in
u the privileged producers would continue to tolerate predation by the unprivileged, as
long as u remains positive. (As we have noted, with u equal to zero the distinction
between privileged and unprivileged people has disappeared, and everyone is deterred from
predation. ) Thus, with ~ equal to u a decrease in u would imply a decrease in I-.
Alternatively, suppose that the distribution of human capital is such that the privi-
leged producers choose to deter predation, Hence, r equals zero. In this case, a sufficient
decrease in u would cause the privileged producers to choose instead to tolerate predation
by the unprivileged, Thus, with a large value of u, but r equal to zero, a decrease in rL
could cause ~ to become positive.
3. Pareto Efficient Distributions of Human Capital
This section analyses the welfare properties of the interpersonal distribution of human
capital. We partition the feasible distributions of human capital into a set of Pareto efficient
distributions and a set of Pareto inefficient distributions. A Pareto efficient distribution is a
distribution such that there is no feasible redistribution of human capital that would result
in a Pareto improvement. A Pareto improvement is an increase in the net consumption of
at least one person without a decrease in the net consumption of any other person.
Because this model assumes that individual productive activities are independent,
and the model also abstracts from trade, if we were to ignore the possibility of preda.tion~
then all interpersonal distributions of human capital would be Pareto efficient. Without
10the possibility of predation, any redistribution oflluman capital would redute so]llebody ’s
consumption. Allowing for the possibility of preda.tiolL. however, irltroduces tlIe possibility
that a redistribution of human capital could result ill a Pareto irllprovellleni,.
As mentioned above, the key to understanding Pareto eficiency irl this lrlode] that
allows predation is to observe that the possibility of predation can affect aggregate l~et
consumption in two distinct ways. First, any time and effort devoted to guarding against
predation reduces the net consumption of producers. Second, if the producers tolerate
predation by the unprivileged, then the human capital of the unprivileged is wasted by not
being used productively,
Let Q denote the aggregate endowment of human capital. Thus,
In analysing the welfare properties of the interpersonal distribution of human capital, we
hold 0 fixed.
Assume that by virtue of birth every person has a nonnegative elldowlnellt of k.
units of human capital. Presumably, k. varies little across economies. .Assume further
that, although education or training can increase a person’s endowment of human capital,
a person’s endowment of human capital cannot be decreased. Thus, for a given value of Q,
a feasible interpersonal distribution of human capital is any combination of k, Ii, and u
that satisfies equation (12) subject to 1{ ~ k ~ k. ~ O.
3.1 Pareto Efficiency with Deterrence
Consider the set of distributions of human capital that are feasible and Pareto effi-
cient conditional on either the distribution being such that the privileged choose to deter
predation by the unprivileged or the distribution being fully egalitarian. With either de-
terrence or the fully egalitarian distribution, the net consumption of a privileged person is
Z[G*(k)], as given by equation (9). Also, by substituting equation (6) into equation (3),we see that z, the net consumptioll of an unprivileged person. is
(13) z =(1 -~#)k”.
Equation (13) says that z is all increasing function of k. .Ac.cordillgly, ally rc~-
distribut,ion of human capital that decreased k. tile hulnd]] capital of an unprivileged
person, would decrease the net consumption of unprivileged people, and ally redistribution
of human capital that increased k would increase the net consumption of the unprivileged
people.
In addition, comparing equations (9) and (13) we see that, if If is larger than k,
then Z[G*(k)] is larger than z. In other words, with deterrence. the net COnSlllnpl, jOn
of a. privileged person is larger than the net consumption of an unprivileged person. An
increase in u would imply a change in the status of some people from being privileged to
being unprivileged. As long as 1[ is larger than k, any redistribution of human capital
that increased u would decrease the net consumption of these people.




Using equations (9) and (14) we find that, given k, Z[G*(k)] is an increasing function
of u. Accordingly, with deterrence, given k, any redistribution of human capital that
decreased u would decrease the net consumption of privileged people,
These observations imply that, with deterrence, any redistribution
that either decreased k or increased u or, given k. decreased u
of human capital
would not result
in a Pareto improvement, Also, any redistribution of human capital that increased k
would increase the net consumption of the unprivileged people. Thus, to determine the
set of Pareto efficient distributions of human capital, we have only to partition the feasible
distributions according to whether or not increasing k, the human capital of an






12) also implies that
dl{
dk
:9) and (15) we obtain




>0 if and only if 1[/k z maz[(lf/k)O, 1],
where ($)0 = (&/&)&
Condition (16) implies that, given u, if and only if If/k > maz[(I{/k)O, 1], then increasing
k and decreasing 1{ would increase the net consumption of privileged people and, hence,
would result in a Pareto improvement. Thus, with either deterrence or the fully egalitarian
distribution, all distributions of human capital such that If/k > maz[(lf/k)O, 1] are
Pareto inefficient. This result reflects the fact that, if If/k is sufficiently large, then
increasing k and decreasing K would result in a large decrease in J{UG*(k), the amount
of time and effort that the privileged have to devote to guarding against predation in order
to deter the unprivileged from being predators, relative to the decrease in the production
of the privileged.
In sum, we have found that, with either deterrence or the fully egalitarian distribution,
if and only if the distribution of human capital is such that either k > ko and 1 < If/k <
(l{/k)” or If/k = 1, then no feasible redistribution of human capital would result in
a Pareto improvement. Thus, with either deterrence or the fully egalitarian distribution,
all distributions of human capital such that either k > ko and 1 < 1{/k < (l{/k)” or
K/k = 1 are feasible and Pareto efficient.
What amounts of net consumption by the privileged and the unprivileged are as-
sociated with these conditionally Pareto efficient distributions? Given the specification of
(l{/k)”, equations (9) and (13), together with equation (12), imply that
(17) Z[G”(k)] = z = (1 – ~O)Q@ if If/k = 1,
13and that
(18) sup{ Z[G*(k)]} > Z[G*(k)] > (1 – ~O)Q(X> z if 1 < 1~/k < (lK/k)O.
The variable sup{ Z[G*(k)]} denotes the supremum of Z[G’*(k)].
3.2 Pareto Efficiency with Toleration
Now, consider the set of distributions of human capital that are feasible and Pareto
efficient conditional on either the distribution being such that the privileged choose to
tolerate predation by the unprivileged or the distribution being fully egalitarian. With either
toleration or the fully egalitarian distribution, the net consumption of a privileged person is
ZIG*(l{)], as given by equation (8), Also, because I(G*(l[) is the minimum amount of
time and effort that each privileged producer must devote to guarding against predation to
deter privileged people from being predators, with G = G*(l{), ZIG*(lf)] is equal to u,
the consumption of a predator. Thus, with either the privileged tolerating predation by the
unprivileged or a fully egalitarian distribution, everyone, whether privileged or unprivileged,
has the same net consumption. Hence, to determine the set of conditionally Pareto efficient
distributions of human capital, we only have to find the set of distributions for which the
net consumption of a. privileged person, ZIG*(I()], is maximized.





Condition (19) implies that, if u is positive, then the value of k that maximizes ZIG*(l~)]
is the minimum value, k., which is every person’s minimum endowment of human capital.
With toleration, setting k equal to k. minimizes the amount of human capital that the
unprivileged waste by being predators rather than producers.





= O with u = l~”>0,






Conditions (20.1) and (20.2) imply that, given k, if a(l – k/Q) > 1 – YO, then the value
of u that maximizes ZIG*(lf)] is u“, where O < u“ < 1. Otherwise, the value of u
that mafimizes Z[G*(K)] is zero. This result reflects the fact that the relative sizes of
a(l – k/Q) and 1 – ~0 determine the relative sizes of the increase in I{ti, the production
of a privileged producer, and the decrease in p, the fraction of his production that each
producer retains, associated with any increase in u and in r.
To simplify the subsequent analysis, while focusing on essential factors, we consider
the limiting case as a approaches one, In the limit as a approaches one, we have
a(l –k/Q) ~ 1 –yd as Q ~ k/yO.
Considering the limiting case as a approaches one, conditions (19), (20.1), and
(20.2), taken together, imply that, with either the privileged tolerating predation by the
unprivileged or a fully egalitarian distribution, if Q is not larger than ko/yd, then the
unique feasible and Pareto efficient distribution of human capital has u = O. This result
obtains primarily because, if Q is small relative to ko, then the minimum fraction of the
economy’s human capital that the unprivileged would waste by being predators rather than
producers would be large.
Alternatively, if Q is larger than kO/yd, then the unique feasible and Pareto efficient
distribution of human capital has k = k. and u = u“ >0. This result obtains primarily
because, if Q is large relative to k., then the minimum fraction of the economy’s human
capital that the unprivileged would waste by being predators rather than producers would
15be small. In addition, given k = ko, setting u equal to IJ” reflects the a.pproprial,e trade
off between the effect of more predators in increasing the amount of human capital wasted
by predators and the effect of fewer producers in decreasing tile total amount of time and
effort devoted to guarding against predation by the privileged. [Recall that l(’XG*(lK ),
which, from equation (5), equals 6/(1 – ~0), is the amount of time and effort that each
privileged producer must devote to guarding against predation to deter privileged people
from being predators and to support a nontrivial equilibrium with positive production.]
What amounts of net consumption by the privileged and the unprivileged are associ-
ated with these conditionally Pareto efficient distributions? Given the specific atioll of u“,
equation (8), together with equation (12), implies that
(21) ZIG*(lf)] = (1 – yL9)Qu if u = O,
and that
(22)
k(J (1 – Q)(1 –y#) l-U
ZIG*(l[)] = v = aa(l – ~)
[ yo – k~/Q 1 Qa if k = k. and u = u“.
In the limit as a approaches one, ZIG* (if)] as given by equation (22) approaches Q – k..
3.3 Unconditional Pareto Efficiency
We can now derive the set of distributions of human capital that are feasible and
unconditionally Pareto efficient. In this derivation we consider three possible situations:
Either the distribution of human capital is fully egalitarian, or the distribution of human
capital is not fully egalitarian and the privileged deter predation by the unprivileged, or the
distribution of human capital is not fully egalitarian and the privileged tolerate predation
by the unprivileged. This derivation allows for the possibility that a redistribution of human
capital that results in a switch from. one of these situations to another could result in a Pareto
improvement. Again, considering the limiting case as a approaches one, the partition of
feasible distributions of human capital into a set of Pareto efficient distributions and a set
.
of Pareto inefficient distributions depends only on the relation between Q and ko/yO.
16If Q is not larger than kO/~O, then the fully egalitaria.11 dist riblltioll of lluII)a Jl
capital, with either u = O or, equivalently, lK/k = 1, is feasible and Pa.relo efficient. 1])
addition, as we have seen, if’and only if the fully egalitarian distribution is Pareto efli(it’lli.
then all distributions such that k ~ k. and 1 < 1(/k < (l(/k)” are also feasible a.lld
Pareto efficient. Thus, if Q is sufficiently small relative to Lo. then Par(~to efficiency
implies either deterrence or the fully egalitarian distribution.
Under what conditions would it be Pareto efficient for the privileged to tolerate
predation by the unprivileged? Also, under what conditions would the fully egalitarian
distribution not be Pareto efficient? If ZIG*(l{)] as given by equation (22) is as large
as the supremum of Z[G*(k)] as given by equation (18), then the distributiol~ of human
capital that has k = k. and u = u“ is feasible and uniquely Pareto eficient. Given
the specification of (l{/k)O, equation (18), together with equation (12), implies that the
supremum of Z[G*(k)] is an increasing function of u. In the limit as u approaches one,
we have
(23) liil sup{ Z[G*(k)]} = +Q”.




Z[G*(Jf)] z ;yl sup{ Z[G*(k)]} if and only if Q >
2 – 1/70”
Equation (24) implies that, if Q is sufficiently large relative to ko, then the distribution of
human capital such that k = k. and u = u“ is feasible and uniquely Pareto efficient. As
we have noted, with this distribution the privileged tolerate predation by the unprivileged,
What distributions of human capital are feasible and Pareto efficient if Q is smaller
than ~, but Q is larger than ko/y6? If Q is larger than ko/~t9, then the distribution
of human capital such that k = k. and u = u“ is still feasible
addition, if Q is smaller than ~_~,vO, then some distributions
17
and Pareto efficient. In
.
such that k > k. and1 < If/k < (l[/k)O are feasible and Pareto efficient. This subset of feasible and Pareto
efficient distributions includes all distributions such that k 2 ko, 1< Ii/k < (Ii/k)O, and
Z[G*(k)], as calculated from equations (9) and (12), is as large as ZIG*(lf)], as given by
equation (22).
In sum, considering the limiting case as a approaches one, if Q is not larger
than ko/~O, then the fully egalitarian distribution and all distributions of human capital
such that k z k. and 1 < 1{/k < (l{/k)” are feasible and Pareto efficient. In this
case, because the average endowment of human capital is small relative to the minimum
endowment of each unprivileged person, some of the distributions of human capital such
that the privileged choose to deter predation by the unprivileged are Pareto efficient, The
fully egalitarian distribution is Pareto efficient in this case, but only in this case.
At the other extreme, if Q is not smaller than ~_~,~O, then the distribution of
human capital that has k = k. and u = u“ is feasible and uniquely Pareto efficient. In
this case, because the average endowment of human capital is large relative to the minimum
endowment of each unprivileged person, Pareto efficiency implies a distribution of human
capital such that the privileged choose to tolerate predation by the unprivileged.
In the intermediate case, if Q is smaller than ~_~,70, but 0 is larger than kof-y%,
then the distribution of human capital that has k = k. and u = u“ and all distributions
such that k ~ ko, 1 < If/k < (If/k)O, and Z[G*(k)] > ZIG*(I[)] are feasible and
Pareto efficient. In this case, Pareto efficiency allows both a distribution of human capital
such that the privileged choose to tolerate predation by the unprivileged as well as some
of the distributions of human capital such that the privileged choose to deter predation by
the unprivileged.
4. Rawlsian Distributions of Human Capital
Now that we have found the set of Pareto efficient distributions of human capital,
let us consider which of the distributions in this set is preferred according to the ~awlsian
18criterion. The Rawlsian criterion selects from alTloIIg the set, of Pareto eficiellt outcollles
the outcome that implies the maximum utility for the least a.dvalltag(~d person.
In the present model, net consumption is a ca.rdillal index of utility. Lloreover, the
net consumption of each unprivileged person is never larger thall the ]Iet, collsulnptio]l of
each privileged person. Accordingly. to apply the Rawlsia.rl criterion ill the present model
we have to determine which of the Pareto efficient distributions of human capital implies
the maximum net consumption for each unprivileged person.
If we were to ignore the possibility of predation, then each person’s net consump-
tion would equal that person’s production. Moreover, because this model assumes that
individual productive activities are independent, and the model also abstracts from trade,
the fully egalitarian distribution of human capital would maximize tile production of each
unprivileged person. Thus, abstracting from predation, the Rawlsian criterion would select
the fully egalitarian distribution, In this case, every person would have net consumption
equal to OQ.
The possibility of predation can radically alter this conclusion. Considering the lirr-
iting case as a approaches one, we see from conditions (17), (18), (21), and (22) that, if Q
is not larger than ko/~i3, then the Rawlsian criterion would still select the fully egalitarian
distribution of human capital. In this case, every person would have net consumption equal
to (1 – ~O)Q. But, if Q is larger than ko/y13, then the Rawlsian criterion would select
the distribution of human capital such that k = k. and u = u“. In this case, every person
would have net consumption equal to Q – ko.
This result says that, if the average endowment of human capital is large relative to
minimum endowment of each unprivileged person, then the distribution that has a posi-
tive number of unprivileged people, each of whom has the minimum endowment of human
capital, maximizes the net consumption of each unprivileged person. M~ith this unegal-
itarian distribution of human capital, the privileged producers tolerate predation by the
unprivileged, and predation results in maximum consumption for everyone.
195. Summary
This paper has studied the relation between inequality alld welfare ill a getleral-
equilibrium model in which people can choose to be either producers or predators. We
considered a society in which some people (the privileged) are well elldowed w’itll huma]l
capital, but in which other people (the unprivileged) are poorly endowed with burnall rapi-
tal. In this society the interpersonal distribution of human capital has two dimensions: the
number of people who are unprivileged and the endowment of human capital of a, privileged
person relative to the endowment of an unprivileged person. Given the aggregate eridow-
ment of human capital, it seemed natural to define a distribution of human capital to be
more egalitarian if either the number of people who are unprivileged is smaller or if the
ratio of the human capital of a privileged person to the human capital of an unprivileged
person is smaller.
We first analysed how the choice of the privileged between either deterring or tol-
erating predation by the unprivileged depends on the interpersonal distribution of human
capital. We found that, if the number of people who are unprivileged is large, but a priv-
ileged person does not have too much human capital relative to an unprivileged person,
then the privileged allocate enough time and effort to guarding against predation to deter
the unprivileged from being predators. Otherwise, the privileged tolerate predation by the
unprivileged. These results obtain because the larger the number of unprivileged people
the larger would be the loss to producers from tolerating predation and because the smaller
the ratio of the human capital of a privileged person to the human capital of an unprivi-
leged person the less is the time and effort allocated to guarding against predation that is
necessary to deter the unprivileged from being predators.
We also found that, if the distribution of human capital is such that the privileged
choose to tolerate predation by the unprivileged, then a decrease in the number of people
who are unprivileged would result fewer people choosing to be predators. But, interestingly,
.
if the distribution of human capital is such that the privileged choose to deter predation,
20then a sufficient, decrease in the number of people W11Oare unprivileged would cause illt’
privileged to choose instead to tolerate predation by the ul!privileged. The explanation
for this apparently paradoxical possibility that a more egalitarian distribution of humaII
capital can result in predation being tolerated rather than deterred was that a decrease in
the number of unprivileged people reduces the loss to producers from tolerating predation.
Next, we analysed the welfare properties of the interpersonal distribution of human
capital. We partitioned the feasible distributions of human capital into a set of Pareto ef-
ficient distributions and a set of Pareto inefficient distributions. The key to understanding
Pareto efficiency in this model was to observe that the possibility of predation can affect
aggregate net consumption in two distinct ways. First, any time and effort devoted to
guarding against predation reduces the net consumption of producers. Second, if the pro-
ducers tolerate predation by the unprivileged, then the human capital of the unprivileged
is wasted by not being used productively.
We found that the partition between Pareto efficient distributions and Pareto inef-
ficient distributions depends on the economy’s average endowment of human capital rel-
ative to the minimum endowment that each unprivileged person has by virtue of birth.
Specifically, if the average endowment of human capital is small relative to the minimum
endowment of each unprivileged person, then some of the distributions of human capital
such that the privileged choose to deter predation by the unprivileged are Pareto efficient,
The fully egalitarian distribution is also Pareto efficient in this case, but only in this case.
But, if the average endowment of human capital is large relative to the minimum
endowment of each unprivileged person, then Pareto efficiency implies a distribution of
human capital with a positive number of unprivileged people and with each unprivileged
person having the minimum endowment of human capital. With such an unegalitarian
distribution, the privileged choose to tolerate predation by the unprivileged.
Taken together, because the minimum endowment of human capital presumably varies
.
little across economies, these results suggest that in economies in which the average person
21has little human capital sorneofth edistributioll so fllulllall ciipitiilsilfll Iliat 111(J ~Jrivil(’g(’d
choose to deter predation by the unprivileged a,rld tile full~r egaliiariiill distrit)utioll ar(~
Pareto efficient, whereas in economies in which the aveuage person Ii:is a larg~ at[loulkt O{
human capital only an unegalitarian distributioll such that tile privileged clloost~ to ~olera.te
predation by the unprivileged would be Pareto efficient, Illterestillgly. ill ecollolllies iu wl[ic-11
the average person has a large amount of humarl capital the fully egalitaria.11 distribut,io[l
would not be Pareto efficient.
Then, we applied the Raw]sian criterion, and we deterl[lilled wllictl of the Pareto
efficient distributions of human capital maximizes the net consumption of the unprivileged.
Because this model assumes that individual productive activities are indepelLdellt. and
the model also abstracts from trade, without the possibility of predation the Ra.wlsian
criterion would select the fully egalitarian distribution. But. the possibility of predatiorl
can radically alter this result. We found that with the possibility of predation. if the
average endowment of human capital is large relative to the rninimunl endowment of each
unprivileged person, as presumably would be the case ill econorllies ill which the average
person has a large amount of human capital, then the Rawlsian criterion would select the
Pareto efficient distribution of human capital with a positive nut[lber of unprivileged people
and with each unprivileged person having the minimum endowment of human capital. With
this unegalitarian distribution of human capital, the privileged producers tolerate predation
by the unprivileged, and predation results in maximum consumptioll for everyone.
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